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INTRODUCTION
The primary question before the Court on appeal is whether or not KDA waived

(ii

the statutory right of redemption under the terms of the Settlement Agreement entered
into between the parties in February 2005 ("Settlement Agreement"). In the Settlement
Agreement, KDA agrees that Pioneer is entitled to foreclose upon the Rich County
property, "including, but without limitation, foreclosing out, terminating, and
extinguishing any and all estates, rights, titles, liens, encumbrances, and other interests of

®

any and all types and natures whatsoever that KDA may have or claim in, on, or to the
Rich County property." The plain language of this provision in the Settlement
Agreement supports the trial court's conclusion that when KDA agreed that Pioneer
could terminate and extinguish any and all rights of any and all types whatsoever, it
included the right of redemption.
·Moreover, the Settlement Agreement contains a paragraph wherein the parties
reserved various rights. Pioneer expressly reserved its rights, claims, causes of action,
and defenses in, on, to, against, and relating or pertaining in any way to all property,
persons, entities, and parties. In stark contrast, KDA only reserved its rights as to all
persons, entities, and parties. KDA did not reserve any rights as to property, clearly
demonstrating its intention to waive the right of redemption.
In interpreting the Settlement Agreement, KDA argues the trial court should have
allowed parol evidence because the Settlement Agreement is ambiguous. Specifically,
KDA sought to introduce the Declaration of Alison Bodily and exhibits 1 and 2 to the
i)

declaration ("Bodily Declaration"). Exhibit 2 of the Bodily Declaration was a
1.
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memorandum from KDA's counsel to Pioneer's counsel requesting various changes to
the Settlement Agreement. The trial court correctly excluded the parol evidence because
admission of the Bodily Declaration violates Utah Rule of Evidence 408 and the
Settlement Agreement is unambiguous. Consistent with current Utah case law, the
proper starting point in determining if a contract is ambiguous, is the writing at issue. If
the writing at issue contains no facial ambiguity, there is no reason to resort to extrinsic
evidence.
KDA also takes the position that the Court of Appeals should hold that the right of
i\

redemption cannot be waived. Pioneer disagrees because the statue at issue does not void
contrary contracts and the Settlement Agreement does not violate public policy.
Additionally, an agreement between competing creditors, in which one creditor waives its
right of redemption, should not be subject to the same scrutiny as such an agreement
between a creditor and debtor.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

KDA has identified four issues on appeal. While Pioneer does not take issue with
issues identified by KDA, Pioneer characterizes the issues as follows:
ISSUE: Does the language of the Settlement Agreement entered into between

KDA and Pioneer waive KDA's right to redeem the real property in question?
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW: Questions of contract interpretation

not requiring resort to extrinsic evidence are matters of law, which are reviewed for
correctness. Fairbourn Commercial, Inc. v. American Housing Partners, Inc., 2004 UT
54, ,r 6, 94 P.3d 292.
2
(.IP
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CITATION TO THE RECORD: Pioneer refers the Court to KDA's brief for
the citations to the record showing the issue was preserved for review.

~

ISSUE: Whether or not parol evidence was admissible for the purpose of varying
or adding to the terms of the Settlement Agreement.

STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW: Whether a contract is integrated is a
question of fact reviewed for clear error. Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren, 2008 UT 20,

ir 10, 182 P.3d 326.

Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law reviewed for

correctness. Id.

CITATION TO THE RECORD: Pioneer refers the Court to KDA's brief for
the citations to the record showing the issue was preserved for review.

ISSUE: Whether or not the statutory right of redemption can be waived by
C'.

\I,'

contract.

STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW: Matters of statutory construction are
questions of law that are reviewed for correctness. Bonnie & Hyde, Inc. v. Lynch, 2013
UT App 153, ,I 14, 305 P.3d 196.

CITATION TO THE RECORD: Pioneer refers the Court to KDA's brief for
the citations to the record showing the issue was preserved for review.

ISSUE: Whether or not the award of attorney fees to Pioneer was appropriate.
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW: The trial court's decision regarding
whether or not to award attorney fees will be overturned only if the trial court exceeded
the bounds of its discretion. Neff v. Neff, 2011 UT 6, ,r 48,247 P.3d 380.

3
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CITATION TO THE RECORD: Pioneer's Motion for Attorney Fees (R. 7461
- 7471). KDA's Response to Pioneer Builders' Request for Attorney Fees (R. 7482 7484). Pioneer's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Attorney Fees (R. 7485
-7487).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
KDA Corporation ("KDA") owned approximately forty acres of real property near

~

Bear Lake, Utah. (R. 7022.) In October 2000, KDA.contracted to sale the real property
to United West Investment Group, Inc. ("United West"). (Id.) United West ultimately
decided not to purchase the real property. (Id.) KDA then contracted to sale the real
property, plus an additional parcel of property, to a successor of United West, Pine Ridge
Properties, Inc. ("Pine Ridge"). (Id.)
In November 2000, Pioneer Builders Company of Nevada, Inc. ("Pioneer") loaned
money to United West to effectuate the sale of the real property. (R. 7023.) Pioneer's
loan was secured by a trust deed, among other documents. (Id.) In August 2001, Pioneer
loaned money to Pine Ridge to facilitate the purchase of the real property, plus the
additional parc~l. (Id.) This loan was also secured by a trust deed, among other
documents. (R. 7023-7024.)
In addition to the trust deeds provided by United West and Pine Ridge, KDA .

@

executed and delivered a guaranty, in favor of Pioneer, in which, among other things,
KDA "absolutely, unconditionally and irrevocably" guaranteed each and every obligation
under and pursuant to the Pine Ridge trust deed, including assuming and undertaking
liability that is "primary, direct, immediate, independent and joint and several" with each
4
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of the respective obligors on each of the respective documents. (R. 7024.) KDA also
signed a trust deed with assignment of rents conveying in trust in favor of Pioneer, as
beneficiary, as security for the loans made to Pine Ridge and the KDA guaranty, certain
real property in Cache County, State of Utah. (R. 7025.)
~

The underlying lawsuit was initiated as a result of default by the trustors. (Id.)
Pioneer sought to foreclose on the real property located in Rich County and Cache
County by filing separate lawsuits in each county. (Id.) Pioneer also sought in its
lawsuits, among other things, to collect any amount still due and owing after its
foreclosures on the real property in Rich County and.Cache Co~ty, including from

~

KDA, pursuant to KDA's guaranty. (Id.)
KDA responded to Pioneer's lawsuit with counter-claims, cross-claims, and thirdparty complaints against the real estate professionals involved in the transaction. (R.
7046.) In February 2005, KDA and Pioneer entered into a Settlement Agreement
resolving all claims between them. (R. 7026.) As part of the Settlement Agreement,
Pioneer agreed to release the lis pendens it filed against KDA's property in Cache County
and assigned its tort claims against the real estate professionals involved in the real estate
transaction to KDA. (R. 7046-7047.) In return, KDA agreed to pay Pioneer $50,000 out
of the proceeds from the sale of the Cache County Property and make a contingency
payment to Pioneer if it recovered on its claims against the real estate professionals. (R.
7047-7048).
KDA stipulated to the relief sought by Pioneer in the first through tenth causes of
action in Pioneer's Second Amended Complaint and agreed to take all steps reasonably
5
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GJ

necessary to ensure Pioneer obtained all of the relief Pioneer requested in the first
through tenth causes of action. (R. 7049.) Paragraph 7 of the Settlement Agreement
contains stipulations regarding releases and reservations of claims. (R. 7050.) KDA
agreed as follows concerning the Rich County property:

ii.
Pioneer is entitled to foreclose upon all of the Rich County
Property, including, without limitation, Parcel -025, including but
without limitation, foreclosing out, terminating, and extinguishing any
and all estates, rights, titles, liens, encumbrances, and other interests of
any and all types and natures whatsoever that KDA may have or claim
in, on, or to the Rich County Property, and any and every part, parcel,
and portion thereof, including, without limitation, KDA's Rich County
Trust Deeds.
(R. 7051.).
In paragraphs 7 d. and 7 e. of the Settlement Agreement, KDA and Pioneer made
reservations as to their existing and ongoing rights. (R. 7051-7052.) Specifically,
Pioneer reserved all of its "respective rights, claims, causes of action, and defenses in, on,
to, against, and relating or pertaining in any way to all property, persons, entities, and
parties of every type, nature, and description whatsoever." (Id.) KDA reserved "all of its
Qi

rights, claims, causes of action, and defenses in, on, to, against, and relating or pertaining
in any way to all persons, entities, and parties (except Pioneer and Call) of every type,
nature, and description whatsoever." (R. 7052).
Based on their settlement, KDA and Pioneer filed a Stipulation and Joint Motion
for Dismissal with Prejudice of Certain Claims between Pioneer Builders, Ralph Call,
and KDA ("Stipulation for Dismissal"). (R. 2197, 7083-7092.) Pursuant to the

6
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Stipulation for Dismissal, the Court entered an Order of Dismissal with Prejudice on
April 4, 2005. (R. 2198-2207.) The Order of Dismissal with Prejudice included the

Ci,i

language quoted above stating Pioneer is entitled, without limitation, to foreclose out,
terminate, and extinguish any and all estates, rights, titles, liens, encumbrances, and other
Git

interests of any and all types and natures whatsoever that KDA may have or claim in, or
to the Rich County property. (R. 2200.) In addition, the Order of Dismissal with
Prejudice included the parties' respective reservations of existing and ongoing rights. (R.
2201-2202).
On September 4, 2015, the District Court entered an order allowing Pioneer to
proceed with the foreclosure of the real property in Rich County. (R. 6427-6449.) A
Sheriffs Sale was held on December 17, 2015, and Pioneer purchased the entirety of the
real property in Rich County with a bid of $200,000. (R. 7029.)
On June 14, 2016, KDA attempted to redeem the real property in Rich County by
serving Pioneer with its Exercise of Redemption Rights along with a check in the amount

ii

of $212,000. (R. 6846-6851.) On June 16, 2016, Pioneer notified KDA via letter that it
was rejecting its attempt to redeem based on the Settlement Agreement entered into
~

between the parties. (R. 7030.)
KDA filed a Motion to Enforce Redemption Right. (R. 6820-7004.) Pioneer
opposed KDA's motion and likewise asked the District Court to enforce the parties'
Settlement Agreement. (R. 7020-7201.) The District Court ruled in Pioneer's favor
finding that KDA waived its redemption right when it entered into the Settlement
Agreement with Pioneer. (R. 7562-7573.)
7
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I.

THE LANGUAGE OF THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT PROVIDES
THAT KDA WAIVED ITS RIGHT TO REDEEM THE RICH COUNTY
PROPERTY

The trial court did not err when it concluded KDA waived its right to redemption
under the terms of the Settlement Agreement. The plain language of the Settlement
Agreement, and interpreting the Settlement Agreement in its entirety, support the trial
court's conclusion that KDA waived its right of redemption under the terms of the
Settlement Agreement.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUDING THE
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IS UNAMBIGUOUS AND EXCLUDING
PAROL EVIDENCE

The trial court properly excluded KDA's parol evidence under Utah R. Evidence
408 and the parol evidence rule. KDA attempted to introduce the Bodily Declaration to
explain the terms of the Settlement Agreement. Exhibit 2 to the Bodily Declaration is a
@

memorandum from KDA's counsel to Pioneer's counsel requesting various changes to
the Settlement Agreement. KDA offered the Bodily Declaration in an attempt to validate
its claim that it preserved the right of redemption. Whether or not KDA waived its right
of redemption is a disputed claim between the parties and, under Utah R. Evidence 408,
the trial court properly excluded the Bodily Declaration.

8
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The Settlement Agreement is not ambiguous and parol evidence should not be
admitted in an attempt to add to, or vary, the terms of the Settlement Agreement. In this
case, the parties' intentions can be determined from the face of the contract without
resorting to parol evidence. None of the provisions in the Settlement Agreement are
capable of more than one reasonable interpretation because of uncertain meanings of
terms, missing terms, or other facial deficiencies.

Ill.

THE COURT SHOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH PARTIES' RIGHT TO FREELY
CONTRACT WHEN THE CONTRACT IS NOT AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY

Courts do not interfere with parties' rights to contract absent a violation of public
policy or other illegality. The Settlement Agreement at issue in this case does not violate
public policy when applying the factors identified by the Utah Supreme Court. Because
the contract does not violate public policy, the Court should not interfere with the parties'
right to contract.
The policy reasons cited by KDA for the Court to hold that the right of redemption
cannot be waived are not at issue in this case. The debtors who borrowed the_ money are
long since defunct entities. There is no risk of an unjust deficiency judgment being
entered against them. Generally, the right of redemption was established to protect
debtors who were in an inferior bargaining position than their creditors. This case does
not involve a debtor's waiver of the right of redemption. It involves a creditor waiving
its right of redemption to resolve a legal dispute with a competing creditor.

9
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i;

ARGUMENT

I.

THELANGUAGEOFTHESETTLEMENTAGREEMENTPROVIDESTHAT
KDA WAIVED ITS RIGHT TO REDEEM THE RICH COUNTY PROPERTY

The first question before the Court is whether the trial court erred when it
determined the language in the Settlement Agreement waives KDA's right to redeem the
Rich County property. "Settlement agreements are governed by the rules applied to
general contract actions." Bodell Construction Co. v. Robbins, 2009 UT 52, ,r 19,215
P.3d 933 (internal quotation marks omitted). "The 'cardinal rule' in contract
interpretation 'is to give effect to the intentions of the parties' as they are expressed in the
plain language of the contract itself." New York Ave., LLC v. Harrison, 2016 UT App
240, ,r 21, 391 P.3d 268 (quoting G. G.A., Inc. v. Leventis, 773 P.2d 841, 845 (Utah Ct.

t

App. 1989). "In this regard, [the Court] construe[s] a contract to give effect to the 'object
and purpose of the parties in making the agreement."' Harrison, 2016 UT App 240,

,r 21,

391 P.3d 268 (quoting Anderson v. Great E. Cas. Co., 51 Utah 78, 168 P. 96(968
(1917)). "A construction which contradicts the general purpose of the contract ... is
presumed to be unintended by the parties." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts§ 202(1) (Am. Law Inst. 1981)
(stating that "if the principal purpose of the parties is ascertainable it is given great
<.t

weight"). "And with that principal purpose in mind [the Court] also interpret[s] the
contract as a whole 'considering each contract provision ... in relation to all of the others,
with a view toward giving effect to all and ignoring none.'" Id. (quoting Green River
Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2003 UT 50, ,r 17, 84 P.3d 1134).
10
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The trial court did not err when it interpreted the Settlement Agreement to mean
that KDA waived its right of redemption. The plain language of the Settlement
Agreement demonstrates the parties' intent that any and all rights KDA has in the
property were extinguished pursuant to the agreement of the parties, including the right of
redemption.
The plain language of paragraph 7 of the Settlement Agreement establishes the
intent of Pioneer and KDA when entering into the Settlement Agreement. Generally,
paragraph 7 of the Settlement Agreement contains stipulations between the parties
pertaining to releases and reservations of claims. In paragraph 7 a. ii. of the Settlement
Agreement, Pioneer and KDA agreed as follows:

ii.
Pioneer is entitled to foreclose upon all of the Rich County
Property, including, without limitation, Parcel -025, including, but
without limitation, foreclosing out, terminating, and extinguishing any
and all estates, rights, titles, liens, encumbrances, and other interests of
any and all types and natures whatsoever that KDA may have or claim
in, on, or to the Rich County Property, and any and every part, parcel,
and portion thereof, including without limitation, KDA's Rich County
Trust Deeds.
The language of paragraph 7 a. ii. clearly states that Pioneer is entitled to foreclose upon
the Rich County property, including, but without limitation, foreclose out, terminate and
extinguish any and all estates, rights, titles, liens, encumbrances, and other interest of any
and all types and natures whatsoever that KDA may have or claim in, on, or to the Rich
County Property. Paragraph 7 a. ii. specifically states that any "rights" KDA claims to
the property are terminated and extinguished. The all-encompassing language used in

11
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paragraph 7 a. ii. leaves no doubt that KDA's right of redemption was terminated and
extinguished. If it was the parties' intent for KDA to reserve the right of redemption in
the face of such all-encompassing language, a specific reservation of the right of
redemption would have been included in paragraph 7 of the Settlement Agreement.
Consideration of the object and purpose of the parties in entering into the
Settlement Agreement further supports the trial court's conclusion that KDA waived its
right of redemption. The parties entered into the Settlement Agreement to resolve the
various claims between them as it related to property rights in the Rich County property,
Cache County property, and KDA's guaranty, of which Pioneer was the beneficiary. In
order to resolve the parties' claims, Pioneer agreed to release its lis pendens against
KDA's Cache County property, so KDA could sell the property, and assign its negligence
claims to KDA. In turn, KDA agreed to pay Pioneer the sum of $50,000 from the sale of
the property in Cache County, make a contingent payment on the negligence claims if
any money was recovered, and allow Pioneer to foreclose on the property in Rich County
and terminate and extinguish any and all ofKDA's estates, rights, titles, liens,
encumbrances, and other interests of any and all types and natures whatsoever in the Rich
County property.
The essence of the Settlement Agreement was that Pioneer would walk away
from any interest it had in the Cache County property and K.DA would walk away from
any interest it had in the Rich County property. Pioneer was willing to release KDA's
obligations under the guaranty, and relinquish any right to the Cache County property,
which served as security for KDA's guaranty, in exchange for Pioneer relinquishing any
12
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iv
claim in the Rich County property. Interpreting the Settlement Agreement to allow KDA
the right to redeem contradicts the general purpose of the Settlement Agreement, which is
KDA receives the Cache County property and Pioneer receives the Rich County property.
Additional language of the Settlement Agreement supports the conclusion that
KDA waived its right of redemption. In paragraphs 7 d. and 7 e. of the Settlement
Agreement Pioneer and KDA respectively reserved specific rights. In paragraph 7 d .
.Pioneer "reserve[ d] all of [its Jrespective rights, claims, causes of action, and defenses in,
on, to, against, and relating or pertaining in any way to all property, persons, entities, and
parties of every type, nature, and description whatsoever." By contrast, in paragraph 7 e.
of the Settlement Agreement, KDA "reserve[d] all of its rights, claims, causes of action,
and defenses in, on, to, against, and relating or pertaining in any way to all persons,
entities, and parties (except Pioneer and Call) of every type, nature, and description
whatsoever." Noticeably absent in KDA's reservation of rights is any reservation of right
or claim, relating or pertaining in any way to property. The fact KDA failed to reserve
any rights concerning the property, including the right of redemption, further
demonstrates the intent of the parties concerning KDA's redemption rights. Interpreting
the contract as a whole, with the principal purpose of the parties in mind, the trial court
properly concluded that KDA waived its right of redemption under the terms of the
Settlement Agreement.
KDA argues that the conclusion reached by the trial court that KDA waived its
right to redeem is erroneous because the Settlement Agreement makes it clear that the
extinguishment ofKDA's rights in the property will be a result of and occur upon the
13
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foreclosure of the property, not upon execution of the Settlement Agreement. (See Brief
of Appellant, p. 24.) Pioneer disagrees with KDA's reasoning. Paragraph 7 a. ii. and
paragraph 7 e. of the Settlement Agreement support the trial court's reasoning and
conclusion. It is clear that in addition to Pioneer foreclosing out KDA's Rich County
Trust Deeds, KDA agreed to Pioneer extinguishing and terminating any and all rights of
any and all types and natures whatsoever that KDA may have or claim in the Rich
County property. When given the opportunity to reserve any right or claim to the
property in paragraph 7 e. of the Settlement Agreement, KDA failed to do so. Whether
KDA gave up these rights upon execution of the Settlement Agreement, or foreclosure of
the property is not relevant to resolution of the issue before the Court. The relevant
question is what rights did KDA give up when it entered into the Settlement Agreement?
Next, KDA asserts that under Pioneer's reasoning adopted by the trial court, all
redemptions would be invalid because the foreclosure sale extinguishes the subordinate
interest. (See Brief of Appellant, p. 25.) Pioneer is not taking the position that a
foreclosure sale extinguishes the right of redemption. Pioneer's position is that while the
language of the Settlement Agreement allows it to foreclose KDA's trust deeds, it also
terminates and extinguishes any and all rights KDA has to the Rich County property. If
the Settlement Agreement simply stated that Pioneer was allowed to foreclose KDA' s
trust deeds, KDA would have retained its right of redemption. The plain language of the
Settlement Agreement goes beyond foreclosure ofKDA's trust deeds and KDA did not
reserve any rights to the Rich County property.
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KDA attempts to persuade the Court that it reserved the right of redemption by
making reference to the terms of the Order and Judgment dated September 4, 2015, and
Pioneer's Application for Writ of Execution filed October 7, 2015. (See Brief of
Appellant, pp. 25-27.) Because the language within the four comers of the Settlement
i)

Agreement is unambiguo~s, Pioneer's and KDA's intentions should be determined from
the plain meaning of the contractual language. See Hahne! v. Duchesne Land, LC, 2013
UT App 150, if 16, 305 P.3d 208 (stating "[i]f the language within the four corners of the
contract is unambiguous, the parties' intentions are determined from the plain meaning of
the contractual language, and the contract may be interpreted as a matter of law.") KDA
fails to explain why the reference to the Order and Judgment dated September 4, 2015,
and Pioneer's Application for Writ of Execution filed October 7, 2015, is needed to
interpret the Settlement Agreement. In light of the trial court's finding that the
Settlement Agreement is not ambiguous, it is improper for KDA to reference extrinsic
evidence on appeal and interpretation of the Settlement Agreement should be limited to
the writing itself.
If the Court is ~nclined to compare the language in the Settlement Agreement to
the language in the Order and Judgment dated September 4, 2015, and Pioneer's
Application for Writ of Execution filed October 7, 2015, to determine the meaning of the
Settlement Agreement it does not support the conclusion that KDA reserved its right of
redemption. The context of the Settlement Agreement, entered into in February 2005,
and the Order and Judgment dated September 4, 2015 are completely different. The
Settlement Agreement was a document drafted to resolve competing claims between
15
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Pioneer and KDA. The Order and Judgment dated September 4, 2015, was an order from
the Court that authorized Pioneer to complete foreclosure and sell the Rich County
property. The parties' intent expressed in the language of the Settlement Agreement
cannot be gleaned by looking to language from a Court order entered more than ten years
after the date of the Settlement Agreement.
Similarly, Pioneer's Application for Writ of Execution, dated October 7, 2015,
identified "(t]hose known to [Pioneer] who may claim an interest in the Property." (R.
6515 at 18). Pioneer identifying KDA as someone "who may claim an interest in the
Property" does not equate to an acknowledgment by Pioneer that KDA reserved its right
of redemption. Especially when the plain language of the Settlement Agreement
indicates otherwise.

n.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUDING THE
SETTLElVIENT AGREEMENT IS UNAMBIGUOUS AND EXCLUDING
PAROL EVIDENCE

The second issue before the Court is whether or not the trial court erred in
concluding the Settlement Agreement is unambiguous and excluding parol evidence.
With its Reply Memorandum in Support ofKDA's Motion to Enforce Redemption Right,
KDA submitted the Bodily Declaration. Pioneer objected to this evidence under Utah R.
Evidence 408 and the parol evidence rule. For the reasons stated below, the Bodily
Declaration was properly excluded by the trial court.
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1. The Bodily Declaration was properly excluded under Utah R. Evidence
408.

Utah R. Evidence 408 states that "[e]vidence of the following is not admissible
either to prove or disprove liability for or the validity of amount of a disputed claim: ...
(2) conduct or a statement made in compromise negotiations." KDA argues that
redemption is not a disputed claim between the parties as that was never part of the
dispute between the parties in the litigation. The present dispute between the parties is
whether or not KDA maintained the right of redemption and that is a disputed claim.
KDA attempted to offer the Bodily Declaration to prove the validity of its claim that it
maintained the right of redemption in negotiating the terms of the Settlement Agreement.
Under Utah R. Evidence 408 the conduct and statements contained in the Bodily
Declaration are not admissible to prove the validity of its claim.

2.
The Bodily Declaration was properly excluded under the parol
evidence rule
The Supreme Court of Utah stated the following concerning the parol evidence
rule:
[a]s a principle of contract interpretation, the parol evidence rule has a
very narrow application. Simply stated, the rule operates, in the absence
of fraud or other invalidating causes, to exclude evidence of
contemporaneous conversations, representations, or statements offered
for the purpose of varying or adding to the terms of an integrated
contract.

Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren, 2008 UT 20, ,r 11, 182 P.3d 326 (quoting Hall v.
Process Instruments & Control, Inc. 890 P.2d 1024, 1026 (Utah 1995)).
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The application of the parol evidence rule is a two-step process: 'First,
the court must determine whether the agreement is integrated. If the
court finds the agreement is integrated, then parol evidence may be
admitted only if the court makes a subsequent determination that the
language of the agreement is ambiguous.'

Tangren, 2008 UT 20, ,r 11, 182 P.3d 326 (quoting Hall, 890 P.2d at 1027). The
Gt
Supreme Court of Utah has "defined an integrated agreement as 'a writing or writings
constituting a final expression of one or more terms of an agreement.'" Id. (quoting
Restatement (Second) of Contracts§ 209 (1981)). "To determine whether a writing is an
integration, a court must determine whether the parties adopted the writing 'as the fmal
and complete expression of their bargain."' Id. (quoting Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz,
28 Utah 2d 261,501 P.2d 266,270 (1972). The Supreme Court of Utah has explained
"that when parties have reduced to writing what appears to be a complete and certain
agreement, it will be conclusively presumed, in the absence of fraud, that the writing
contains the whole of the agreement between the parties." Id.

A.

The Settlement Agreement is an Integrated Agreement

The Settlement Agreement at issue in this case is an integrated agreement.
Paragraph 10. i. of the Settlement Agreement states:
This Agreement contains all the agreements and understandings of and
between the Settlement Parties with respect to the subject matters treated
herein, and may not be amended or altered in any way except in a
writing signed by both of the Settlement Parties hereto. This Agreement
has been mutually negotiated and shall not be construed more strictly
against one of the Settlement Parties than another. This Agreement shall
be construed and interpreted pursuant to Utah law.
Because the Settlement Agreement is an integrated Agreement, parol evidence is
admissible only to clarify ambiguous terms.
18
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B.

The Settlement Agreement is not Ambiguous

KDA asserts that because the parties provided the trial court with "differing
interpretations" of the Settlement Agreement the Ward test applies and any relevant
evidence must be considered to determine if a facial ambiguity exists. (Brief of
Appellant, p. 34.) The Ward and Daines cases relied upon by KDA cannot be reconciled
with recent decisions from the Utah Supreme Court. See Lifevantage Corporation v.

Domingo, 208 F.Supp.3d 1202, 1215 (D. Utah September 22, 2016)(stating that Ward
and Daines are irreconcilable with the Utah Supreme Court's more recent
pronouncements on determining if a contact is ambiguous). As discussed below, the
proper starting point for contract analysis is the writing at issue.
As noted previously, when the Court interprets a contract, or settlement
agreement, it determines "the intent of the contracting parties" by "first look[ing] to the
writing alone." Robbins, 2009 UT 52, 119, 215 P.3d 933. "If the writing is
unambiguous, [the Court] determine[s] the intent of the parties exclusively from the
'plain meaning of the contractual language.'" Id. (quoting Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth

Corp., 2009 UT 2, ,r 44, 201 P.3d 966). "Only where there is ambiguity in the terms of
the contract may [the Court] ascertain the parties' intent from extrinsic evidence." Id.
"A contractual term or provision is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one
reasonable interpretation because of uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other
facial deficiencies." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). "[T]erms are not ambiguous
'simply because one party seeks to endow them with a different interpretation according
to his or her own interests."' Mind & Motion Utah Investments, LLC v. Celtic Bank
19
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Corp., 2016 UT 6, ,r 24,367 P.3d 994 (quoting Saleh v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2006 UT 20,

,r 17, 133 P.3d 428).

"If the parties' intentions cannot be determined from the face of the

contract, 'extrinsic evidence must be looked to in order to determine the intentions of the
parties."' Id. (quoting WebBankv. Am. Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88, ,r 19, 54
P.3d 1139). "Accordingly, under Utah law, the court must first interpret the Agreement
using 'the writing alone to determine its meaning."' Domingo, 208 F.Supp.3d at 1216
(quoting Giusti, 2009 UT 2,

~

44, 201 P.3d 966).

The trial court properly determined the intent of the parties by referring to the
~

writing alone, and not allowing extrinsic evidence. The language used in the Settlement
Agreement is not susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation because of
uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other facial deficiencies. The language of
the Settlement Agreement unequivocally terminates and extinguishes "any and all estates,
rights, titles, liens, encumbrances, and other interests of any and all types and natures

@>

whatsoever that KDA may have or claim, in, on, or to the Rich County Property." This
provision of the Settlement Agreement coupled with paragraph 7 d. of the Settlement
· Agreement wherein KDA makes no reservation of rights as to the property, only to
persons, unambiguously demonstrates the intent of the parties that KDA would not have a
right of redemption.

C.

KDA's Memo Attached to the Bodily Declaration Supports the
Conclusion that KDA Waived its Redemption Rights

Pioneer maintains any reference to parol evidence, including the Bodily
Declaration, is unnecessary to interpret the Settlement Agreement. However, Pioneer

20
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does not want to leave the Court with the impression that it is unwilling to address the
Bodily Declaration and KDA's claim that the attached memo demonstrates KDA
intended to preserve its redemption right. Language in KDA' s memo actually supports
Pioneer's position that KDA waived any right to redeem the property. Specifically, in the
last sentence of paragraph 2 ofKDA's memo, counsel for KDA pointed out the
following, "[s]ection 7 ii. also has language about extinguishing all rights which needs to
be modified to allow the redemption rights and subordinate Trust Deed rights still held by
KDA." (R. 7246.)
The Settlement Agreement that was agreed to and signed by the parties contains
language "extinguishing any and all estates, rights, titles, liens, encumbrances, and other
interests of any and all types ... " At the time the Settlement Agreement was drafted, KDA
obviously understood that use of this language to extinguish its right to redeem the
property and asked that it be removed. However, the language remained in the
Settlement Agreement signifying Pioneer did not agree to KDA reserving its redemption

~

right.

III.

THE COURT SHOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH PARTIES' RIGHTS TO FREELY
CONTRACT WHEN THE CONTRACT IS NOT AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY

The third issue raised by KDA is whether the Court should hold that the statutory
right of redemption cannot be waived by debtors or subordinate creditors. Pioneer
submits that the proper analysis ofKDA's argument starts with the agreement the parties
entered into and whether or not it violates public policy. Because the Settlement
Agreement does not violate public policy, such a conclusion is not warranted in this case.
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"'
Pioneer will then examine the basic public policy behind the right of redemption and
~

explain why a blanket holding that agreements to waive the right of redemption is not
warranted.

1.

The freedom to contract

"People are generally free to bind themselves pursuant to any contract, barring
such things as illegality of subject matter or legal incapacity." Howick v. Salt Lake City

Corp., 2013 UT App 218, if 34, 310 P.3d 1220 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). "Accordingly, 'an enforceable contract can coexist with a statute that may
conflict with its terms so long as the contract does not offend the public policy to which
the statute gives voice." Howick, 2013 UT App 218,134,310 P.3d 1220 (quoting Lee v.

Thorpe, 2006 UT 66,122, 147 P.3d 443. "For a contract to be void on the basis of
public policy, there must be a showing free from doubt that the contract is void against
public policy." Howick, 2013 UT App 218, 'if 34,310 P.3d 1220 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).

2.

The Settlement Agreement does not violate public policy

The Utah Supreme Court has identified two factors in determining whether a
contract is signed against public policy. Id. The first is whether the statute specifically
declares contrary contracts to be void. Id. The second is whether the contract offends
public policy or harmed the public as a whole, as opposed to the contracting party only.

Id.
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A.

The Statute at Issue Does Not Void Contrary Contracts

The statutory right to redeem in Utah is found in the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. See Utah R. Civ. P. 69C. Utah R. Civ. P. 69C does not specifically declare
contracts waiving the right to redeem are void. An analysis of the first factor weighs in
~

favor of permitting parties to contract away their right of redemption.

B.

The Settlement Agreement Does Not Harm the Public as a Whole

The Settlement Agreement at issue does not offend public policy or harm the
public as a whole. If anyone was harmed by the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the
harm was limited to KDA. In making this statement, Pioneer does not concede that KDA
was harmed in anyway by waiving the right to redeem in light of the consideration
provided for such waiver.
The facts of the current case are analogous to those in Ockey v. Lehmer, 2008 UT
37, 189 P.3d 51. In Ockey, Scott Ockey ("Ockey") was the beneficiary of two trusts that
provided him ownership of almost fourteen percent of a ranch. Ockey, 2008 UT 3 7,

,r 4,

189 P.3d 51. According to the terms of the trusts, they terminated at the latest in 1986
when Ockey reached 28 years of age. Id. at ,r 17. Upon termination of the trusts, the
trustees retained only the authority to wind up the trusts and transfer the ranch to Ockey.

Id. In 1994, the trustees of the trust purported to convey ownership of the ranch to a
separate entity, IJ\.11IG. Id. at ,r 8. Ockey signed a document consenting to the transfer of
his ownership interest in the ranch in exchange for a partnership interest in IMHG. Id.
Ockey later filed suit claiming the 1994 transfer was void because his trust
terminated on his 28 th birthday, eight years prior to the 1994 conveyance, vesting in him
23
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individually both the legal and equitable title to his interest in the ranch. Id.at ,r 11. The
Court of Appeals determined the 1994 transfer was merely voidable, as opposed to void.

Id. at ,r 23. In arriving at this conclusion the Court of Appeals noted that no statute
declared "ultra vires acts by trustees absolutely void as against public policy." Id.
Second, the action by the trustee only impacted Ockey, there was no harm done to the
general public. Id. In arriving at this conclusion the Court of Appeals noted that "in light
of the freedom to contract, we have a duty to employ 'any reasonable construction' to
declare contracts 'lawful and not in contravention of public welfare.'" Id. (quoting

Frailey v. McGarry, 116 Utah 504, 211 P.2d 840, 847 (1949)).
Similar to Ockey, the Settlement Agreement at issue only has implications for
KDA, not the public as a whole. Neither of the factors enunciated by the Utah Supreme
Court for determining if a contract violates public policy can be satisfied in this case.
Consequently, the trial court's decision that KDA validly waived its right to redeem
@

should be upheld.

3.

The policy behind the right ofredemption

There is both an equitable and statutory right of redemption. The equitable right
of redemption refers to a mortgagor's ability to redeem the property after default, but
prior to foreclosure. The statutory right of redemption refers to a mortgagor's ability to
~

redeem the property within a specified period of time after foreclosure. The idea that the
right of redemption cannot be waived has its roots in the doctrine against the clogging of
redemption. As noted by the Florida Supreme Court:

24
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The doctrine against clogging the equity of redemption of a mortgage is
an old English doctrine brought forward in this Country to prevent
lenders taking an inequitable advantage of distraught borrowers. The
doctrine would prevent the mortgagee from taking through any trick,
scheme or contrivance the equity of redemption from the borrower.
MacArthur v. North Palm Beach Utilities, Inc., 202 So.2d 181, 185-86 (Fla. 1967). The

Superior Court of New Jersey explained the reason for the rule as follows:
This doctrine is based upon the relative situation of the debtor and the
creditor; it recognizes the fact that the creditor necessarily has power
over his debtor which may be exercised inequitably; that the debtor is
liable to yield to the exertion of such power; and it protects the debtor
absolutely from the consequences of his inferiority, and of his own acts
done through infirmity of will.
Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Doerr, 123 N.J. Super. 530, 547, 303 A.2d 898, 907 (Ch.

Div. 1973). With these policy considerations in mind, the equitable right of redemption
could not be waived or released at the time of or as part of the mortgage transaction.
However, it is generally held that the mortgagor may release the equity of redemption by
subsequent agreement so long as it is a fair bargain for adequate consideration. See
Russo v. Wolbers, 323 N.W.2d 385, 390 (Mich. App. 1982); Ringling Joint Venture II v.
Huntington Nat. Bank, 595 So. 2d 180, 182 (Fla. 1992); Doerr, 3 03 A.2d at 908; Moore

v. Beverlin, 99 P.2d 886, 888 (Okla. 1939); and Gouldv. McKillip, 99 P.2d 67, 71-72
(Wyo. 1940).
With the underlying policy of the right of redemption in mind, the Court should
not accept KDA's invitation to make a blanket declaration that all contracts to waive the
right of redemption are void. Many of the arguments advanced by K.DA focus on the
protections the right of redemption provides to the debtor, or mortgagor, such as
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protecting the debtor from an unfair deficiency judgment. In addition, KDA argues that
if it is determined by this Court that creditors can seek and include waivers in their
agreements with debtors, their use will begin.
In response to KDA's arguments, there is no risk in this particular case of an
unfair deficiency judgment resulting to the initial creditors United West and Pine Ridge.
United West and Pine Ridge are long since defunct entities who don't stand to gain or
lose anything as a result of the decision. Additionally, there is no risk that if the Court
approves of the agreement between KDA and Pioneer that creditors will be allowed to
include waivers of the right of redemption in mortgage documents. The circumstances of
this case are factually distinct from a situation where a mortgagee includes language in a
mortgage waiving the mortgagor's right to redeem. Moreover, following the line of
jurisprudence from other Courts, a waiver of the right of redemption would only be valid
if it is an agreement subsequent to the mortgage transaction supported by adequate
consideration.
The present case does not present a situation where a debtor is being taken
advantage ofby a creditor. Pioneer and KDA were both creditors of United West and
~

Pine Ridge with competing claims to the Rich County property. Pioneer and KDA had
equal bargaining power during the course of their settlement negotiations and both were
represented by counsel. Pioneer provided adequate consideration to KDA for the
relinquishment of its right to redeem the Rich County property when it released its lien
on the Cache County property, allowing KDA to sell the Cache County property, and
assigning its negligence. claims to KDA. Pioneer's interest in the Cache County property
26
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was the result of a trust deed signed by K.DA as security for its guaranty that Pine Ridge
would perform under the terms and conditions of the Pine Ridge note and trust deed.
Pioneer releasing its lis pendens on the Cache County property, and thereby releasing the
security for KDA's guaranty, was a significant concession made by Pioneer. The
transaction between Pioneer and K.DA was a fair and just transaction, supported by
adequate consideration, and free from fraud, undue influence, and oppression.
Consequently, there is no basis to set it aside.
IV.

ATTORNEY FEES

Paragraph 10 j. of the Settlement Agreement contains an attorney fee provision
allowing the prevailing party to recover costs and attorney fees incurred in enforcing the
Settlement Agreement. The trial court awarded Pioneer its attorney fees incurred in
enforcing the Settlement Agreement. "When a party who received attorney fees below
prevails on appeal, the party is also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on appeal."

Austin v. Bingham, 2014 UT App 15, ,r 33, 319 P.3d 738. Pioneer having received
attorney fees from the trial court, and anticipating it will prevail on appeal, respectfully
requests an award of attorney fees incurred on appeal.
CONCLUSION
The trial court did not err in interpreting the Settlement Agreement. The trial
court properly analyzed the plain language of the Settlement Agreement in concluding
that K.DA waived its right of redemption. The trial considered the general purpose of the
Settlement Agreement, and interpreted the Settlement Agreement as a whole, in properly
determining KDA waived its right of redemption.
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The trial court correctly determined the Settlement Agreement is not ambiguous
and did not err in excluding parol evidence. KDA offered the Bodily Declaration in an
effort to validate its claim that it reserved the right of redemption in the Settlement
Agreement. Utah R. Evidence 408 prohibits the use of a statement made in compromise
negotiations to validate a disputed claim. That is precisely how KDA attempted to use
the Bodily Declaration in this case.
Moreover, the trial court properly determined the Settlement Agreement was not
ambiguous by looking first to the writing along. Finding the.Settlement Agreement was
· an integrated agreement, void of ambiguity, the trial court appropriately excluded parol
evidence. KDA's position that the Court should look to extrinsic evidence to determine
if the Settlement Agreement is ambiguous, does not square with the most recent Utah
case law determining whether a writing is ambiguous. The trial court properly limited its
evaluation of the Settlement Agreement to the four comers of the document.
Finally, the Court should decline KDA's invitation to hold that the statutory right
of redemption is not subject to waiver. KDA's argument has validity as it relates to
contracts between debtors and creditors at the time of creation of the mortgage.
However, that is not the relationship of the parties in this case. The doctrine against the
clogging of redemption addresses the relative inequities between the debtor and creditor
and protects the debtor from its inferior bargaining position. The Court should evaluate
each case in determining if the agreement was just and supported by valid consideration
in determining whether or not there was a proper waiver of the right of redemption.
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Additionally, the Court should not infringe on the right to freely contract. The
Supreme Court of Utah has held that a contract can coexist with a statute that conflicts
with its terms so long as the contract does not violate public policy. The Settlement
Agreement does not violate public policy and should be enforced as drafted.
Based on the foregoing, Pioneer respectfully requests the Court affirm the decision
of the trial court and find that KDA waived its right of redemption when it entered into
~

the Settlement Agreement wifu Pioneer.
Dated November 30, 2017.
HILLYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN, P.C.

~,n~~

N~derson
R. Christian Hansen
Attorneys for Pioneer

<ii
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